Tag Archives: Macro

You can’t get Blood from a Stone

In the hope that someone in the EU reads it:I: Inflation is a tax. Create inflation when salaries are stale and spending will collapse

II: Printing money is stealing funds from savings and from efficient companies to give it to inefficient and indebted governments.

III: Trying to increase tax revenues to bubble-period figures is impossible. Those revenues disappear when the bubble bursts. You have to bring spending to pre-bubble levels.

IV: Increasing spending and debt means passing the bill or the consequences of a default to our children.

V: Offsetting private investments with government spending assumes that politicians are better managers and investors than private entrepreneurs.

VI: More taxes, less growth, less revenues. Same spending, more deficit. More debt, bigger hole.VII: Increasing debt today is to assume that we deserve to spend today the expected productivity and efficiencies of the future.

VIII: If our policy is that countries don’t have to worry about debt because governments don’t need to pay it we shouldn’t be surprised with increased cost of borrowing.

IX: Increasing public spending today assumes that the same governments that made spending mistakes in the past will now change their way and do it well.

X: If a country’s debt is “low” and its cost “manageable” yet demand for its bonds is collapsing and costs soaring, the debt is neither low nor manageable.

 

The Euro House of Cards and the Greek Temporary Relief

After a week of maximum tension in Europe driven by the Greek elections, Spanish and Italian bond yields, and Cyprus, another one that needs a bailout, things seem to be stabilizing. As suspected, New Democracy -the conservatives- have won in Greece but they will need to form a coalition in the next 3 days. Germany have already suggested this may allow some loosening of program terms but Eurozone bond yields remain at historical highs and the challenges remain. Yet Greece solves nothing. At the close of this post (Monday 18th) Spain 10 year soared to 7.00%, a spread to the Bund of 553bps.The solution to the debt crisis in Europe is evident. No more reckless spending, reduce debt and avoid forcing monetary expansion measures. After consuming billions of dollars in expansionary policies without success, Europe should stop and think that the damage is greater than the benefit. All these mechanisms have proven ineffective . We have seen five consecutive years of stimulus plans in Europe, a total of $2.63 trillion, with no evidence of success. Providing liquidity and financial relief must be temporary measures, not structural. To demand half a trillion in new stimulus each year is madness.

The solution is fiscal prudence, halting the spiral of political spending, cleaning banks’ balance sheets-preferably paid by shareholders and bondholders-, attracting capital and eliminating unproductive subsidies.

The European House of Cards

The European crisis continues and this page ” The European Super Highway of Debt “ shows visually the size of the house of cards. More debt is not going to help.

In the European credit market we have seen this week a few interesting things:

  • Despite the austerity measures, Spanish public debt has grown 5.39% in the first quarter to 774.5 billion euros, 72.1% of GDP. Reforms must continue, but much faster.
  • The Spanish risk premium to the Bund stands at 553 basis points . Why? Because debt and financing costs would soar if the country was to use the loan of 100 billion to recapitalize the troubled banks, making it more difficult to repay that debt. The key issue to tackle is that international investors are selling government bonds, leading to the Spanish banks having to buy more public debt. Almost 67% of the country’s debt is now in national hands.
  • The credit default swaps (CDS) in France and Germany are up almost 12% in a month, showing that the crisis is still spreading. All CDS, including Germany’s, have risen on the risk of another stimulus plan/shot of debt. This is what happens when one breaks the principle of responsibility of creditors. Structurally rescuing banks and countries endangers the whole system.
  • The International Monetary Fund on Friday urged Europe to help Ireland refinance its crippling bank bailout and consider taking equity in state-owned banks to help Dublin return to bond markets and avoid a second bailout next year.
  • We are told again and again that the ECB and Germany do not support peripherals . However, the numbers say otherwise. The Bundesbank has lent to the periphery of Europe 699 billion euro since January within the Target scheme II, equivalent to almost 25% of the GDP of Germany. Spanish banks have asked the ECB for a further 7.4 billion euros, making a total of 288 billion so far.
  • While Europe, the ECB, EFSF or ESM, provides support, the countries contributing funds to these institutions are almost all highly indebted and are funded in many cases at much higher rates. Il Corriere della Sera echoed the irony that Italy will contribute 19 billion euro to the 100bn loan to Spain, lending it at a 3.3% rate when Italy has to borrow in the markets at 6%.

Look at the chart below. Over 85% of the money that is contributed to the European stability fund is provided by heavily indebted countries and their contribution is not capital. It is debt.

The Greek Relief

In all this week heading into the Greek elections we have read comments that central banks “maybe” “may” “study” the “possibility” of a concerted action to support the economy. Failed before? Try and try again.

Greece shows us the fragility of Europe’s policy of “debt with more debt.” Greece is not the problem, it is part of it, but it can cause a big financial turmoil given the web of cross-country loans.For starters, Greece will need a new additional injection of 15 billion within weeks. Remember in April 2010 when former Spanish president said that the country would gain about 110 million euros a year -yes, a year-with the loan to Greece? Now, neither loan nor gain. A donation.

To put it simply:

New Democracy winning, with a coalition of pro-Europe parties, solves nothing. It is ironic to see the markets rejoice at the fact that the same party that lied about the countries’ finances is now winning. Greece will probably renegotiate the terms of the bailout, yet require a package of “growth”- ie debt- for infrastructure projects financed by the EIB. Funded is probably too big a word, because it is highly unlikely that the loan will be repaid. The “cost” of this option is estimated at 50 to 60 billion Euro in a period of 18 months. JP Morgan estimates only €15bn of €410bn total “aid” to Greece went into economy – rest to creditors, yet the financial hole of lending to Greece has only grown.

The reality is that no matter who ends in government, in Greece what has won is the scheme of a hypertrophied state, political spending and cronyism between government and financial institutions. And that additional debt will be funded by a Euro-zone with fewer resources and increasingly isolated from international markets.

The giant financial web, the house of cards of the Euro-zone, is the reason why every time there is an announcement of intervention the placebo effect lasts a few hours an bond yields explode higher. The  house of cards of debt is the root of the problem and only tackling it would be the beginning of the solution

At the close of this article, there is speculation again with the possibility of a massive shot of liquidity (LTRO) from the European Central Bank, but this has a considerable risk. Banks use most of that liquidity to buy sovereign debt, creating a vicious circle. On the one hand, liquidity does not reach the real economy, lending to households and businesses continues to fall, and on the other hand, it doubles the risk. The bank balance sheet risk and the public debt risk together. This is because banks have ​​it more difficult to attract funding as their sovereign bond portfolio gets larger and riskier, impairing financial entities’ balance sheets.

The stubbornness of the European Union to solve a debt problem with more debt only increases the fragility of this house of cards. Fortunately, now there is no turning back because the creditworthiness and the credibility damage is already done. Now, the entire European Union must address the shortcomings of its foundation and find a real fiscal union and implement credible fiscal prudence. Only then, and not before, will Europe see international capital returning and see sustainable economic growth.

You can watch my interview in Al Jazeera on the Spanish crisis here
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2012/06/20126126534386935.html

Anthology of Shocking Market Quotes

In this crazy market there are moments to cherish. The recent collapse has generated memorable quotes from conversations with brokers and analysts. Here are my top 10:
  1.  “No one owns this stock” (Me: “it is 100% owned every day”) Him: “you know what I mean” (Me: “No I don’t”)
  2.  “The company has to take a $4bn write-off, which would be very positive for returns”
  3.  “Why would you think that a State Owned Company will not increase tariffs by 20%?”
  4. “If you forget the sovereign and macro concerns, it is very cheap” (tied with “”We leave that to the strategists” and “On an absolute basis, the stock is cheap”  )
  5.  “Stock overhang should not matter because it gives opportunity to buy cheaper”
  6.  “Seven percent yield is very attractive” (Me: “But sovereign is at 6.5%”) Him: “Why would sovereign matter?”
  7.  “Earnings downgrades are not relevant, although consensus will have to go down 20%”
  8.  “Semi-State Owned Enterprises have less risk because they will be allowed to earn medium profits”
  9.  “I don’t use P/E for valuation, I don’t believe their accounting methods or find them relevant”
  10.  “I don’t look at EV, I’m recommending an equity, not debt”
Of course, these are added to the classics “everything is discounted” and “my estimates are very conservative” etc… 
And, as always, never forget the Top Three Sentences to Identify a Great Short when you read a broker report:
  •  Fundamentals Haven’t Changed
  •  It’s A Good Company
  •  Dividend Yield Is Supportive
From meetings with companies, here are my Top 10:
  1.  “It’s not a profit warning, it’s a revision of estimates” (tied with “”this is an opportunity for longer term investors”)
  2.  “Management ownership of stock is low because if we owned a lot of stock it could compromise our long term perspective”
  3.  “This acquisition has not destroyed value. Depends what you define as value creation”
  4.  “Paying the dividend in shares proves our commitment to maintaining shareholder remuneration in difficult times”.
  5.  “A convertible bond is not dilutive because shares will go up more in the long term”
  6.  “Of course we have kept our targets, we are just rebasing them”
  7.  “Our plan has not changed, it has just been postponed”
  8.  “Leverage doesn’t impact fundamentals”
  9.  “In the long term we will be proven right”
  10. “You cannot judge the valuation of the company on earnings and balance sheet”
  11. Deservedly… My all time favorite: “We are committed to having the highest dividend yield of our sector

And from Buyside, the mother of all… “The market is wrong”, “It’s only a correction”, “catalysts abound” or “why is X stock down/up?” … culminating in “My friend has told me that this is going up“.

Daniel Lacalle, June 12, 2012

The Myth of European Austerity In Five Graphs

This article was written by Manuel Llamas and Domingo Soriano published by Libre Mercado here. All copyright Libertad Digital and Libre Mercado. (Wednesday 23rd June 2012).

“A lie repeated a thousand times becomes the truth”. This well-known sentence, attributed to the master of Nazi propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, could also serve to illustrate the great deception of the alleged public austerity in Europe. Since the outbreak of the debt crisis, it is widely repeated that Germany has sought to impose on the rest of the EU partners an adjustment plan focused on cutting costs and implementing structural reforms that would foster economic growth.

This strategy has been harshly criticized by many economists and by the Southern European countries, the weakest in this crisis, with Greece leading the critics. In fact, analysts, politicians and union leaders blame all the current problems of Europe, including the Greek default, on the imposed austerity measures. After the recent French and Greek elections, the critics of Merkel’s strategy have begun to gain notoriety, to the extent that the European summit to be held on Wednesday will focus more on how to boost growth through government spending (stimulus) than on further cuts in policy to reduce the deficit and debt burden.

However, official data (Eurostat) shows that the much-touted European austerity is today little more than a myth. The Greek default was not due to the demanded cuts but due to the decision to keep a bloated state unchanged. Likewise, the evolution of spending, deficits and public debt in the euro area shows that the austerity only exists on paper. Neither governments have stopped spending well above their means, nor have they undertaken structural reforms to enable their economies to improve their productivity and grow solidly in the near future.

More public spending

The most striking figure, amid all the rhetoric against the cuts, is that public spending in the euro area as a whole has grown by almost 7% between 2008 and 2011, reaching 4.65 billion euro.

In the South of Europe, those most affected by austerity in theory, the evolution is similar: Public spending in France rose by 8.6% since 2008, in Spain, 4%, in Italy, 3%, in Portugal, 7.8%, while in Greece, despite all the announced cuts, spending fell just 8.5% over the 2008 level, although today its public sector continues to spend 2% more than in 2007 (just before the crisis).

In essence, no European country has managed to reduce their public spending to 2004 levels, a few years before the start of the international crisis, which itself could be considered as an exercise in austerity. Not at all. The following chart summarizes the evolution of public spending in these countries, measured in nominal terms at current prices.

auste01

auste02In fact, the situation hardly changed if we look at the evolution of public spending in real terms after inflation.

More deficit and debt

Of course, increasing public spending also meant higher deficit and public debt. As such, in the middle of alleged austerity, the deficit in the euro area as a whole, far from diminishing, has tripled since 2008 , from 2.1% of GDP to 6.2% in 2011, while public debt has grown from 70.1% in 2008 to 87.2% of GDP last year.

As we can see in the graph below, the public sectors in Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal, the four southern European countries most affected by the debt crisis, are still spending more than they earn. Only a few countries in the North and East of the continent (exemplified here by Germany and Estonia) have maintained their public at deficit under control during these years of crisis.

Chart above shows public deficit.

Obviously, if the deficit is out of control every year, public debt will continue a worrying upward trend. As we can see in the image below, all the countries of southern Europe have public debt figures that are much higher than that held at the beginning of the crisis. Even Spain, which began with a very reasonable level of public debt of less than 30% of GDP, is now touching 70% and could end 2012 above 80%.

deuda-publica-22052012

Greece, meanwhile, is at levels close to 200% and Italy is moving steadily to 130%. With these levels of debt, it is logical to see international investors unwilling to buy more South European government bonds, and the to see the CDS and spreads versus the Bund soar. But governments and political parties continue to blame the “evil speculators” or the unfairness of German taxpayers, strangely reluctant to lend more money when nobody else wants to either.
Chart above shows public debt growth.
Along with the complaints about unreasonable “cuts” allegedly “imposed by the markets” (or the Germans), in recent weeks we have seen a growing public debate that wrongly puts austerity and growth as two opposite concepts. They are not. Austerity is the antonym of waste. In fact, recent history shows that more government spending does not foster growth, and does not help to get out of economic difficulties.

The current crisis began in 2007. From then until late 2011, the four southern European countries we are considering implemented aggressive public “investment” policies that Keynesian economists would qualify as clearly expansionary, with deficits close to or above 10% for several years. If this theory were true, Greece, Portugal and Spain would have already recovered and the growth generated by the “virtuous circle” created by government spending would be paying their debts. But none of this happened.

deficit-publico-22052012

crecimiento-pib-22052012

Meanwhile, Germany and Estonia followed the opposite path and imposed austerity. The result is that both countries had a strong relapse in 2009, with the political cost that it entails . But they are recovering faster and now have much stronger economies. Meanwhile, in Spain, the “Plan E” of investment in infrastructures, an enormous waste of public funds with its vast implication on cost of borrow and deficit, and other public spending measures have failed to stem the crisis. But the message currently repeated over and over is that it takes even more government spending, for much longer, to foster growth. But… For how long?

Chart above shows growth in GDP


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