Tag Archives: International

Anthology of Shocking Market Quotes

In this crazy market there are moments to cherish. The recent collapse has generated memorable quotes from conversations with brokers and analysts. Here are my top 10:
  1.  “No one owns this stock” (Me: “it is 100% owned every day”) Him: “you know what I mean” (Me: “No I don’t”)
  2.  “The company has to take a $4bn write-off, which would be very positive for returns”
  3.  “Why would you think that a State Owned Company will not increase tariffs by 20%?”
  4. “If you forget the sovereign and macro concerns, it is very cheap” (tied with “”We leave that to the strategists” and “On an absolute basis, the stock is cheap”  )
  5.  “Stock overhang should not matter because it gives opportunity to buy cheaper”
  6.  “Seven percent yield is very attractive” (Me: “But sovereign is at 6.5%”) Him: “Why would sovereign matter?”
  7.  “Earnings downgrades are not relevant, although consensus will have to go down 20%”
  8.  “Semi-State Owned Enterprises have less risk because they will be allowed to earn medium profits”
  9.  “I don’t use P/E for valuation, I don’t believe their accounting methods or find them relevant”
  10.  “I don’t look at EV, I’m recommending an equity, not debt”
Of course, these are added to the classics “everything is discounted” and “my estimates are very conservative” etc… 
And, as always, never forget the Top Three Sentences to Identify a Great Short when you read a broker report:
  •  Fundamentals Haven’t Changed
  •  It’s A Good Company
  •  Dividend Yield Is Supportive
From meetings with companies, here are my Top 10:
  1.  “It’s not a profit warning, it’s a revision of estimates” (tied with “”this is an opportunity for longer term investors”)
  2.  “Management ownership of stock is low because if we owned a lot of stock it could compromise our long term perspective”
  3.  “This acquisition has not destroyed value. Depends what you define as value creation”
  4.  “Paying the dividend in shares proves our commitment to maintaining shareholder remuneration in difficult times”.
  5.  “A convertible bond is not dilutive because shares will go up more in the long term”
  6.  “Of course we have kept our targets, we are just rebasing them”
  7.  “Our plan has not changed, it has just been postponed”
  8.  “Leverage doesn’t impact fundamentals”
  9.  “In the long term we will be proven right”
  10. “You cannot judge the valuation of the company on earnings and balance sheet”
  11. Deservedly… My all time favorite: “We are committed to having the highest dividend yield of our sector

And from Buyside, the mother of all… “The market is wrong”, “It’s only a correction”, “catalysts abound” or “why is X stock down/up?” … culminating in “My friend has told me that this is going up“.

Daniel Lacalle, June 12, 2012

What If Germany Turns Off The EU Funding Tap?

(This article was published in Cotizalia on May 26th, 2012)Another week and as part of our leaders think that the rest of the world is wrong, capital continues to fly away from Europe. €700m a day according to press. The credit and financial credibility of the Eurozone couldn’t be any lower. Yes, my friends, investors will not return if the numbers are not solid, and politicians cannot prohibit selling.

Eighteen European summits in two years. European politicians seem increasingly more detached from the real problems of the economy. How can they meet again without reaching an agreement on anything? They seem to give a message of selfishness to the public, and that they are cheating to investors.

We get constant calls to promote growth, which would be fine if they were not calls to encourage the same subsidized wasteful spending of the past. Funily enough, if the EU had cut part of its €141bn budget, out of which 45% goes to “employment and growth”, by today the continent would have a lot less debt and a lot more growth. In any case, I think that we will gradually see a more logical reform agenda for Europe.

We are outraged to see that Germany finances itself at near zero rates while Southern Europe countries finance themselves at 6% or higher. But instead of thinking that, perhaps, the Central European austerity plans work, the press and politicians say that Germany is going against us, “drowning” us.

We hear that the blame for the debt crisis should be pinned on Germany which broke the deficit limits in the early 2000s, which “obviously” led everyone else to go into a debt frenzy. Here nobody is to blame for anything. It’s like those people that stuff themselves with Big Macs and blame McDonald’s for their obesity. If a bank fails, blame it on the “ill will of the anglosaxon press.” If the stock market falls, blame it on Greece or hedge funds, or both. And the giant real estate bubble, the massive subsidy culture and the savings banks’ recklessness have Helmut Kohl to blame. Please

However, countries that have implemented austerity and budget control, from Estonia to Germany, are those who are better off today. We should not demonize them, but learn together how to attract capital and get out of this debt mess. Austerity -cutting giant political spending- and growth -not subsidies.

Austerity and growth are not mutually exclusive. Reckless spend and growth are.


From a market perspective, the only way to reduce risk premiums and attract investor interest is just moving towards a single tax system, and to contain government expenditure, which has done nothing but grow even in years of “austerity”. Public spending in the EU has not fallen in most countries between 2008 and 2011. In Spain it is still 4% higher than in 2008.

The graph below is devastating. Either we adapt spending to “pre-bubble” levels or the CDS will not stop rising.

Why we should not allow the ECB to become the worst hedge fund in the world

When we say that countries should receive more money from the European Central Bank we forget that it can not infect its balance sheet at the rate of one trillion euros per semester.

Germany, the Netherlands and the countries of central Europe are those who have to carry the financing risk. Not France, which has a serious debt problem. And if they close the tap, it will be bad. But if they open the tap too soon and too much it will be worse. Because they run out of water for the next fire.

There are several things we should know about the European Central Bank:

  1. . The ECB’s current debt is monstrous. At 23 or 24 times its assets, with only 82 billion euros in capital and reserves. Of course, the Fed’s balance sheet is also unacceptably high, 53 times its assets … The big difference is that the capitalization of the Fed does not depend on severely indebted entities such as the European states. But as I always say, we should not copy the ones who do wrong and reclaim our right to do worse. Let’s remember that the U.S. is on the brink of a “fiscal cliff.”
  2. . The ECB weakens with the losses incurred from its purchases of sovereign debt. We are talking about latent losses between 55 and 70 billion euros (source Barcap and Open Europe). Of course, many will say that there are no “losses” because the ECB has not sold the bonds -a “bull market” argument- but anyway we want to see it, systemic risk is increasing and does not dissipate by buying more bonds, as we have seen since November. In fact, losses have increased in 2012.
  3. . The European Central Bank has already contributed to the stabilization of the European market, excessively aggressive and quickly. With more than 1 trillion. And the ECB should keep powder dry in case of future emergencies, because the future ain’t what it used to be, to quote Jim Steinman.
  4. . Saying that “we must use the money of the ECB” is false because it is not disposable money. It is debt, which must be funded through more sovereign debt. The ECB Balance sheet growth goes also against our future tax bills.
  5. . To those parties that demand that Europe should “capitalize “the debt of the ECB: Where will that money come from? Furthermore, it an indirect default that would severely impact the creditworthiness of all solid countries of the Eurozone.
The plan
Once we understand that going back to 2007 can not be the goal, that the bubble and the party is over, we will see things are much clearer and less negative.Eurobonds cannot be implemented when one party in a small country can bring half of Europe to its knees. Creditworthiness would collapse when there is no unity in economic and fiscal policy, and the risks spread, as we mentioned here. Eurobonds, no thanks. I hope we have learned something from the subprime crisis. Packing and hiding toxic assets does not reduce the risk, it increases.No, Germany is not closing the tap, in my opinion. Neither they are going to let anyone drown. Let’s not be dramatic. What Europe has to do here is to stop the party of political spending and subsidies. That’s not drowning. Germany has an exposure to the EU of 500 billion euros and the risk of financial contagion between European countries far exceeds the estimates of many banks.

However, I keep hearing that we need a growth plan, which sounds great if it was not for the fact that it’s a borrowing plan. As of today, and after two years writing about it, I can not believe that Europe is betting on more debt. Remember  that almost no European country has created GDP growth ex-debt in the last 22 years. Have we not learned from all those ridiculous infrastructure plans?. I leave you a figure: the European economy generated less than $1 of GDP for every $ 2.5 of debt (Barcap and IMF data). That is, we continue to build the huge ball of debt in the vague hope that growth will multiply exponentially some day.

This week I have seen some possible proposals that would go to the June summit. The recapitalization plan in Europe would happen of three phases:

1) A fund to pay debt (Redemption Fund) that incorporates the indebtedness of over 60% of GDP backed by gold reserves of the States. This fund would repay that debt against a commitment to economic reforms, adjustments and more severe cuts guaranteed in the Constitutions of the member states. The problem? The gold to debt ratio of troubled countries is very low. An average of 6.1% for the Eurozone and 3.5% for Spain or 5.8% for Italy.

Gold Res

2) A line of credit to banks to ensure liquidity needs, but not capital needs. We seem to forget that these are mostly all listed companies that can and should access their investor bases to recapitalize themselves.

Additionally, the idea is to try not to create false inflation . The economic miracle of  Central Europe is based, among other things, on multiplying by three the number of low-paying contracts (mini-jobs). An increase in inflation would be lethal because the euro-zone countries have never been able to control it when it overshoots, especially when it’s external inflation (commodities).

And finally, tackle the unjustified strength of the Euro currency versus the US dollar, to devalue and promote competitiveness, reducing the need for internal devaluation we have seen so far. It will take the market to do this last bit, as economic expectations of the euro-zone are adjusted to more realistic figures.The key is shows in the above graph. Either we attract private capital back once we have proven real creditworthiness, or we continue whinging blaming the Germans, the markets or Hedge Funds.

Germany and the ECB are not the problem, but they are not the solution. Only countries can save themselves. If not, there will come a time when Germany and the ECB runs out of money for bailouts.

Hopefully in June, EU leaders will forget about trying to re-create 2007 and think of a more rational future.To watch my interview on Al Jazeera about the Bankia and Spain (Realplayer Quicktime or Oplayer needed): http://dl.dropbox.com/u/62659029/iv_daniel_lacalle_250512_0.mpg

Further reading:

Eurobonds? No Thanks. Debt Isn’t Solved With More Debt: http://energyandmoney.blogspot.co.uk/2011/11/eurobonds-no-thanks-debt-isnt-solved.html#

What happened to put Spain on the verge of intervention?: http://energyandmoney.blogspot.co.uk/2012/04/what-happened-to-put-spain-on-verge-of.html

Why Italian and Spanish CDS can rise 40%… and Greece is not to blame:

The Greek Drama

(This article was published in Cotizalia on February 2012 and updated on June 17 for the elections)The exit of Greece from the euro and another default seems almost a certainty. An exit and yet another default.

Putting hundreds of billions into a state that consumes every bailout without tackling the issues of corruption and excess spend, when everyone discounts the inevitable, is a futile exercise and a collective suicide of the European Union. And bailouts have no positive effect on peripheral risk, which is still at levels that were considered “unacceptable” two years ago, despite unlimited liquidity injections.

The Greek state, which has more public workers than Spain with four times fewer inhabitants, has wasted bailout after bailout and continues to delay reforms, and now threatens to melt into a political debacle, with some parties asking to re-negotiate the treaty… After receiving the money.

I recommend you read the chapter on Greece from “Boomerang “by Michael Lewis to understand why the money that has been lent will not be recovered easily. But first and foremost, keeping this painful endless drama has no positive effect for Greece. It only helps, delays the pain actually, to the lending banks, especially German and French, which accumulate €138 billion of Greek debt.

No wonder that France and Germany, who keep €57 and €34 billion of Greek debt respectively, are those who insist on keeping the terminally ill in the euro at all costs, although the country’s GDP collapses at an annual rate of 4-6%, and debt to GDP is at 130%.

Rescuing Greece does not solve anything in a country that overspends 8% of its entire GDP every year, while revenues collapse and new expenditures appear every quarter. A bottomless pit in a system, the euro, within which it can not and will not recover.

And the difference between Greece and other European countries, like Portugal, is that its political parties are not accepting to make the needed reforms. The whole system is becoming almost a swindle of promised reforms in exchange for a bailout that never reaches the population (80% of the bailout money returns to the banks to pay interests) but the people do suffer the budget cuts, which happen everywhere except where they are needed (in the bloated political and public system).Rescuing Greece does not work, we have seen it many times. But would it really be a debacle if Europe allows Greece to restructure and exit the euro, staying in the euro zone as a member similar to Poland, with its own currency?. I always say that if Greece formally bankrupts it clarifies and limits the risk, and we can narrow down and isolate the problem.

Europe can not afford to pay the equivalent to 10% of Spain’s GDP every five months to Greece -to the banks, I must say- to get nowhere.

Given a scenario in which Italy has refinanced only 15% of their maturities for 2012 and Spain only 28%, many of the European Union officials fear that leaving Greece on its own would have a huge impact on the credit default swaps of countries.

The problem in Greece is not the problem of Portugal or Spain or Italy. Those are countries who have dealt in the past with significant challenges and dealt with them. Greece has not balanced a budget for decades.

The cost of rescuing Greece would be another 130 billion euros to start, plus more than 200 billion euros that Europe can consider gone. But Greece’s economy needs to deal with a much larger issue. The political debacle and corruption. So bailouts will not help. That is the Greek drama. And the same politicians, even under different party names, will not solve it. Because the bailout system keeps them alive at the expense of the people.Update for the elections

The Greek elections have scared so many countries that we hear cries to “study” the “possibility” of a concerted action by central banks if Greece leaves the euro. Such is the likely contagion impact.

The Greek election analysis has been done in the markets from a Manichean perspective. New Democracy are the good guys and the bad guys are Syriza. I am more interested in the economic impact of any outcome, and as such, I fear that Greek elections, no matter what happens, will deliver a result that will be bad in any way for European debt.

I say this because, either due to another bailout -and Greece has received the equivalent of 115 Marshall plans in the past years -or by default, Greece shows us the fragility of Europe’s debt web and the risk of covering “debt with more debt.” Greece is not the problem, it is part of it, but it can make a big impact on the global economy due to the exposure to its debt from other countries.

For starters, Greece will need a new additional injection of 15 billion within weeks. Remember in April 2010 when former Spanish president said that the country would gain about 110 million euros a year -yes, a year-with the loan to Greece? Now, neither loan nor gain. Donation.

To put it simply:

. If New Democracy wins , the conservatives or a pro-troika coalition, Greece will probably renegotiate the terms of the bailout, yet require a package of “growth support”-translation: debt- in infrastructure projects financed by the EIB. Financed might be a big word, as these will likely not be repaid. The “cost” of this option is estimated at 50 billion to 60 billion euros in 18 months.

. If Syriza -the left- wins or an anti-bailout coalition reaches government, they will threaten with leaving the euro, and option that could cost Europe between 300 to 400 billion euros, according to an analysis of the Eurogroup, or one trillion, according to Lukas Papadimos. And if they stay, they will force a revision of the austerity programs, an estimated cost of 150 billion if we assume the costs of stopping the adjustments and another partial restructuring of its debt.

. Of course, if Greece goes to a third round of elections, which cost the not inconsiderable amount of 35 million euros each, we should be ready for another hot summer.The reality is that no matter who wins, in Greece the scheme of a hypertrophied political state, spending and cronyism between government and party is the only one who does not suffer. And that any cost of the Greek outcome will be funded by additional debt from a Eurozone with fewer resources which finds itself increasingly isolated from international markets.

(This last update was published in Cotizalia on June 15th 2012)

From UBS:

If they were to leave the Euro, it is likely that a new drachma could lose half of its value when introduced. That’s consistent with other episodes of countries abandoning fixed exchange rate regimes – for example during the Asian crisis of 1997/98. A 50% depreciation of the currency means that Greek GDP in euro would be halved too. As a consequence, the debt to GDP ratio would double. This means that, in order to reduce the ratio by one third, our original target to make the trajectory “sustainable”, the haircut needed is now two-thirds. This simply doubles the loss for foreign investors. In the case of a ½ haircut, it would have to become a 3/4 haircut. In this scenario, the estimated cost for the European taxpayer of a one-third haircut is no longer €60.6Bn, but potentially €121.3Bn. The cost for the European taxpayer in case of a 50% haircut is no longer €91.0Bn, but €136.4Bn.Additionally, Target 2 imbalances would have to be added to the bill, this is currently worth 104Bn. We estimate that the total cost for European taxpayers in case of an exit of Greece would be almost four times more, at €225Bn.

From RBS:

eKathimerini reports that a new opinion poll suggests that the Greek elections will see SYRIZA in a face-off against New Democracy. According to the survey, SYRIZA would garner 28% in elections next month, while ND, which co-signed Greece’s debt deal with socialist PASOK but has long pushed for a renegotiation of the terms of the agreement, would get 24%. PASOK would come in third with 15%, according to the poll, which was carried out last week. Other opinion polls put ND ahead of SYRIZA, which are expected to clash in this election campaign.

Worth looking at HSBC’s solid report published on May 23rd on the implications of a Greek exit:

Devaluations can be really damaging for a short term that is already very difficult for the population:

The Greek exit is manageable, but contagion might not:
And the four possible outcomes of the Greek crisis

Greece could run out of cash this month, despite its widely heralded second bailout.   http://www.cnbc.com/id/47700847

Interesting to see Credit Suisse Macro conference polling results:

Do you think Greece will exit the Euro by year-end 2012?
1.Yes 29%
2.No 71%

Sources: UBS, RBS, Zerohedge, HSBC

The Spanish Banking Reform And The Devil’s Alternative

(This article was published in Cotizalia on May 12th 2012)

There is hope and doubt among investors following the announcement of the Spanish financial reform. And like it or not, investors are the only real solution to help finance the so-called “property management agencies” (bad bank), the term used for the entities that will house the toxic assets of Spanish banks, generated after a decade of real estate bubble.

There is hope because it is the first reform that looks real. But there are doubts, especially because it is not clear which will be the discount to be applied to the valuation of toxic loans, or what will be the formula to finance the gap between loan value and real asset value. The answer, in my opinion, is that if the discount is not strong funding will be complicated.Investors told the government in many meetings that they will only accept an “American” solution, a bailout (TARP) and a complete clean-up of the toxic mess created by real estate. However, the Spanish government does not want to take such a high a political cost, by undertaking a massive bailout that previous administrations failed to undertake. The policy of “pretend and extend” has been incredibly damaging both for the country and for financial institutions. The interventionist regulation of the Bank of Spain and lousy management of the loan portfolio of some entities, not all, made the financial crisis deeper and longer.

The true liberal solution would have been to let the bad banks fail, auction their assets, and let the solid banks emerge stronger. The problem is, and was, to allow publicly managed entities (the savings banks) go under, and the political cost that it would entail.

The other solution would have been to create a giant debt-to-equity swap program that would take care of the toxic loans and re-capitalize the banks. Two problems there as well. One, the size of the problem, more than €170bn, and two, the contagion effect on the holders of that debt, mostly European banks and domestic entities, which would face the dilution with a domino effect of re-capitalization needs.The Spanish government faced the devil’s alternative, remembering Frederick Forsyth’s novel about a situation in which all options entailed huge challenges. Allowing bad banks to fail, or a “USA TARP solution” or a “Swedish solution”, buy the loans at once at real market price. But the cost to the taxpayer would be enormous, between 17 and 30% of GDP, and it could mean bankruptcy for many public institutions, which would have a greater political cost yet. The devil’s alternative.

All the options to solve the mistake of “waiting until it clears” and denying the bubble of the last four years are financially complex and politically difficult. That is why the government in Spain is hoping that the solution will include foreign investors. But these will not allow another half-baked solution, but immediate and total cleaning. And the risk is that this new reform is perceived as courageous, but with unresolved issues, and probably too long -two to five years- to implement.In 2008 we were told that the maximum exposure to troubled real estate loans of the banking system in Spain was €25 billion. Today, four years later, the figure many of us had in mind is now official. Nearly €184 billion in troubled non-performing loans. And someone should be held accountable for the loss of credibility of the enormous amount of incorrect and half-clear information that was provided to markets in the past years to try to “reassure” investors.

At least, the Government puts the problem on the table . The solution is less obvious. But the alternative of the devil tells us to be drastic. It may hurt in the short term, but it cuts the gangrene . Leaving the solution in the hands of the same regulator and the same managers which extended and masked the problem “while markets recover” can cause Spain a major problem. Because credibility is lost in a day and it does not recover in years. And it’s an urgent matter.

In Spain, which prided itself of having no sub-prime crisis – these are things of the evil Americans- no less than €73 billion of the total €184 billion in toxic loans correspond to “land”. This is important because one of the things that separates Spain’s real estate bubble from others in the OECD is that some banks and cajas (savings banks) had the brilliant idea of ​​giving loans to land before urbanization. This has to be completely written-off. Because finished properties can be sold, maybe at 40%, 50% or 60% discount, but credit to land is worth almost nothing. The real estate adjustment cost other countries between 20% and 40% of GDP and massive dilutions in banks. In Spain it will probably be similar. But it’s the beginning of the solution.In 2004, a good friend, a professor at a prestigious business school, told me how surprised he was to see such a “diverse” professional profile in the new Spanish bankers attending his course. Politicians, trade unionists, philosophers, among others.”That’s what free money does, everybody is Rothschild until the music stops” he said. And it stopped. The problem is not that it stopped, but that many of these financial entities, mostly public-owned savings banks, waited for years hoping that the music and the party returned… Spanish real estate only fell 22% from the top while unemployment soared to 24% and the economy tanked because most of the inventory of unsold houses was kept “until prices recovered”, to avoid large mark-to-market losses, through troubled loans.

It is worth noting that the creation of real estate management vehicles (bad banks) and public capital injections will not increase credit immediately to the real economy, because the problem of Spain remains a public and private debt of 350% of GDP, and the deleveraging process is unavoidable. In addition, banks, once they have tried to put out the fire of the real estate hole, face a challenging economic environment. And with expectations of a fall of GDP also in 2013, according to the EU, the bad loans (NPLs) remain a problem. It is impossible to increase credit in an economy where credit expansion was close to 8% pa for a decade, leveraged more than three times its gross domestic product, where the return on assets of many banks is less than its cost of capital.

. If the State is involved in funding the bad banks, but the country accepts bubble-time valuations, the need for constant injections will keep Spain in unsustainable debt ratios. In fact, the government deficit would increase (including state guarantees)  from 87% today to 110% .

. Injections of public money are short term loans and would not affect the taxpayer only if the market valuations are realistic and don’t require additional injections.. Of the €310 billion that we mentioned earlier, €184 are already considered within the category of problematic (delinquent). Of these, €44 bn are already provisioned, ie about 25% of the value of the credits. The remaining amount of real estate loans considered “healthy” and not yet provisioned (€122 bn) are not all fine and secure. As the economy worsens, a part of these will also become non-performing. Let’s face it. Because it can cost between 1% -2% of GDP over three years if the country allows more “hide, pretend and extend”.

. Spain should not try to hide the difficulties of bad banks, those are already sentenced. It should ensure and enhance the situation of the good banks -very good, some of them- and not allow a contagion from a lack of credibility and perception of mismanagement that is not, nor can be generalized . The country cannot allow a capitalization problem -serious, but solvable at market prices- to become a problem of solvency of the system.

Who funds the gap between loan value and true market value of the real estate exposure?

According to the different alternatives considered, the market supports an ECB or EFSF credit line. The problem would come from the demands on tax hikes and additional cuts that such aid would entail. And it’s the same old problem . Debt with more debt that is financed with taxes anyway.

On the other hand, a public funding solution also seems remote because of the need to increase borrowing at a time when spreads to the German Bund are at all-time highs (480bps). And with the system’s credibility into question, forget about Eurobonds to finance real estate bad loans clean-up.

Of course, the most logical is to attract the participation of foreign capital , through partial debt-to-equity swaps, IPOs or placements of convertibles, which will only succeed if the market perceives that valuations of the assets are really discounted and attractive. A 20% -30% discount after a peak-to-current drop of only 22% would not easily create enough investor appetite.

The worst of past mistakes made by banks, regulators and government, is that through our stubbornness of maintaining that nothing was a real problem we have risked the discredit of our financial system, which could spread the problem from the weak banks to the good ones, and from bad managers to solid ones.

It is good to read that some bank rule out any resort to state funds and may make all provisions against operating profits. To separate the bad from the good is much better than the previous policy of infecting healthy assets mixing them with toxic assets, because the risk does not dissipate, it is contagious. Let us separate everything, and show actual market prices. And the solution will be in front of our noses. After four years of evident crisis, this is the opportunity to be realistic.To watch my interview in Al Jazeera about the Spanish banking issues go: (Quicktime or Oplayer required) http://dl.dropbox.com/u/62659029/iv_daniel_lacalle_250512_0.mpg

Further reading:

Eurobonds? No Thanks. Debt Isn’t Solved With More Debt: http://energyandmoney.blogspot.co.uk/2011/11/eurobonds-no-thanks-debt-isnt-solved.html#

What happened to put Spain on the verge of intervention?: http://energyandmoney.blogspot.co.uk/2012/04/what-happened-to-put-spain-on-verge-of.html

Why Italian and Spanish CDS can rise 40%… and Greece is not to blame: