Tag Archives: International

Hara-kiri: Turning Europe Into Japan

This article was published in El Confidencial on October 12th 2012

“EU wins the Nobel Prize for pillaging its People with debt and bailouts.” Keith McCullough

“Doing a rescue right bank is more costly, not less, which is why political leaders prefer to zombify rather than clean up their banking systems”. Yves Smith

This week I had a meeting with readers of El Confidencial and commented that the global sovereign debt bubble is already bursting, a bubble that is closely linked to reckless public spending financed with a bloated banking sector that is now rescued with public money and the creation of bad banks.

States fail to grasp the problem of shrinking assets and deleveraging. The available capital to invest in sovereign debt has been shrinking every year by 3.5% globally since 2007, while government issuances and government-guaranteed bank bailouts have increased by 8% pa. In Spain we are six years behind most countries in the clean-up process, so the impact is likely to be larger and in a shorter period of time.

When the regional governments and the EU member states came to London to try to pitch their bond issuances they always told us that their banks were world-class models of management and risk control, and that all the regions individually had less debt than Japan. Now we run the risk of seeing the two lost decades of Japan by copying their policy. We want to be a “Japan without Toyota”. And Japan has its own serious problems.

Japan 1

The bad bank and the financial system bailout, like Japan 

Japan carried out bailout after bailout from 1995 to 2005 and in 2008 under the same premise that we have now in Europe, a premise that has already failed in Ireland. “Everything goes up in the long term”. The long term will solve everything, valuations are “attractive” and creating a bad bank will improve credit to the real economy. Well, no.

Doubts about the bad bank in Spain are not coming from uncertainty, but from the certainty that it hasn’t worked in the past. Investors do not want to accept the valuations of loans and reject investing in the bad bank. The press calls them “vulture funds”. A failed bank that cannot sell its assets or clean its loans meets a government without money and both demand that international investors buy toxic assets at an agreed price between the first two so that it doesn’t look bad in front of creditors and voters… Yet the one the press calls “vulture” is the investor.

From the lost decade … to the two lost decades

Sorry for the poor quality of the chart below, but it shows the following. The OECD has spent more than 4.9 trillion euros to rescue banks from the crisis. That’s 4 times the GDP of Spain. Except in very specific cases, like the United States and little else, virtually nothing of that “aid” has been recovered. Why do they do it?.

Because it is feared that the fall of banks is more harmful than keeping them zombie and wait until the crisis ends and valuations rise. But it doesn’t work. Toxic is toxic now and in ten years. And governments never think of “working capital” and “interest accrual” as a problem while the “long term” arrives.

Japan 2

Five years ago a French banker told me that “no one dares to analyse let alone reject a loan to the government”. It is extremely difficult to clean the system from a way of doing politics, of building useless infrastructure, housing bubbles and interventionism in what is euphemistically called “growth policies”.

The problem of bad banks is that past experiences do not help, and even if we repeat again and again that the crisis was of US origin, the problem is Europe. Let me show you a few figures to illustrate the enormous problem of the European banking system:

Half of the world’s largest banks are in the European Union. 56% of European banks have political or public control. In 2010, U.S. banks had a balance sheet of 8.6 trillion (80% of GDP). In the European Union, banks’ balance sheets exceeded 43 billion euros (350% of GDP). According to the IMF, European banks have to divest up to 4.5 trillion euros. Will credit flow? No.

Japan 3

At this point it is doubtful that the discount at which the Spanish bad bank will buy toxic loans is adequate. In fact, what many perceive is that the problem of the loan portfolio is not of “non-performance” but absolute insolvency, especially in land. Another risk is that the bad bank may have only 10% of capitalization making it a giant leveraged bet on the rebirth of the housing bubble. When the government says that the bad bank will not cost taxpayers a cent it is just saying that they expect -pray- that asset prices will rise. Meanwhile citizens have less disposable income due to confiscatory tax policies. It is difficult to see a recovery in housing with wage and disposable income deflation, just like in Japan in the 90s.

Last week the Irish Minister Joan Burton commented that the Irish bad bank, NAMA, will probably lose 15 billion euros of the 32 billion paid for the “toxic loans” acquired by the taxpayer at a “bargain” 58%” discount.

The solution, in my view, is the “bail-in” of banks. Liquidate the problematic entities with bondholders and shareholders taking losses. Europe cannot have a banking system that is five times larger than the American. A bail-in would separate the good from the bad banks and address the problem of public debt paid with taxes and spent on bailouts.

Sinking the economy the Samurai way

All I read over and over is that Europe needs “social contract and growth policies”, which means more welfare state, more government planned infrastructure and not worrying about deficits… Like Japan. But Europe is not Japan. And even if it were, it does not work. Europe cannot emulate the race of debt and public spending made by Japan because it would be committing hara-kiri .

Japan is the dream of a European interventionist government or a minister of Civil Works: Expenditures on useless infrastructure, endless civil works and a pyramidal welfare state increasingly at risk of insolvency due to its declining population.

Japan spends 60% more than its revenues, has a deficit of nearly 10% of GDP, net debt – deducting some government assets – of 135% of GDP. In 2013 Japan has to issue debt equal to 60% of its GDP (source The Atlantic).

Half of the Japanese budget is wasted on debt interest expense and pensions. Does this sound familiar?. With an aging population in which the pyramidal structure of the welfare state and public spending were unchanged, Japan is living on borrowed time and its citizens contribute their savings to maintain a public debt that is not secured by assets. Does this sound even more familiar?

In addition, 95% of Japanese debt is held by local investors. In Spain, Portugal and Italy it is close to 65-70%. This seems to be the goal of the EU leaders for peripheral countries. Local buyout of public debt. But the Japanese save and their companies are world leaders in exports. Japan repatriates currencies. Europe, especially Spain, consumes currencies.

And yet, the “Japanese” solution to the recession is what some seem to repeat over and over again, eternal social guarantees and public spending, even if this has only led to a crisis of the “two lost decades” and an unaffordable debt.

Japan 4

The fans of the “policies of growth” want Japan without Toyota… And it does not work. 

Japan has modern industries and technology, moderate unemployment and a powerful industry. It also has a large savings ratio. Despite this and being a world superpower, Japan is heading towards the largest debt crisis after another decade of reckless spending. Because it depends on the savings of an ageing population whose disposable income continues to decrease. The crisis could be the next financial tsunami, because the pyramid scheme of debt financed by domestic savings is being consumed.

Those in Europe that demand the European Central Bank to behave like the Bank of Japan, fuelling the public debt bubble, and that want the state to undertake “guaranteed welfare and growth policies” are betting on being Japan without its private savings or industries. It’s suicidal.

The solution is not to borrow against our grandchildren building more useless airports and trains in a Ponzi scheme to subsidize the short-term placebo effect of ephemeral subsidized employment. Zombi banks must be liquidated, without cost to anyone but shareholders and creditors. We need real market economy.

The solution hurts because there are no miracles. De-leveraging will take a long time, and in the meantime we must revitalize the European economy by attracting private investment. But that does not provide votes or photo opportunities inaugurating useless bridges. We want Japan, but without Toyota. Someone will pay.

Top 10 Ronald Reagan quotes

  1. A hippie is someone who looks like Tarzan, walks like Jane, and smells like Cheetah
  2. I’ve noticed that everybody that is for abortion has already been born
  3. Here’s my strategy on the Cold War: We win, they lose
  4. Socialism only works in two places: Heaven where they don’t need it and hell where they already have it.
  5. The nine most dangerous words in the English language are: “I’m from the government and I’m here to help.”
  6. The government’s view of the economy could be summed up in a few short phrases: If it moves, tax it. If it keeps moving, regulate it. And if it stops moving, subsidize it.
  7. How do you tell a communist? Well, it’s someone who reads Marx and Lenin. And how do you tell an anti-Communist? It’s someone who understands Marx and Lenin.
  8. It has been said that politics is the second oldest profession. I have learned that it bears a striking resemblance to the first.
  9. I have left orders to be awakened at any time in case of national emergency, even if I’m in a cabinet meeting.
  10. Recession is when your neighbour loses his job. Depression is when you lose yours. And recovery is when Jimmy Carter loses his.

Why the ECB plan is no early Christmas

This article was published in El Confidencial on September 8th 2012

“In central banking, as in diplomacy, style, conservative tailoring and an easy association with the affluent count greatly and results far much less” John Kenneth Galbraith

Euphoria. All is solved. After Thursday’s announcement from the ECB regarding unlimited purchases of short-term sovereign bonds, Draghi and Merkel, the “enemies of Spain and Europe,” according to some press, are now our saviours. Investors seek to protect themselves against inflation through stocks and commodities. By now there is no doubt that we are moving towards an inflationary period driven by financial repression and aggressive monetary policies.

From my point of view, the ECB plan only manipulates the price of short-term bonds artificially. Access to ECB funding is not linked to growth and solvency and is not aimed at rewarding the efficient. It will provide liquidity judging only by price without questioning whether such price is fair or not. It also runs the risk that countries receiving the liquidity will delay reforms knowing that if they push the limits they will receive a bailout. In essence, the ECB could be breaking the principle of responsible lending, a mistake that, in my view, is affecting the entire EU and discouraging long-term investment and capital.

I also believe that this plan simply transfers peripheral risk to countries like France, which do not have sufficient economic strength to endure the added risk. But above all, the ECB plan leaves the medium to long term solution of the economies in pro-state policies that do not promote the creation of new businesses and jobs. In the US I hear talks of SMEs, private job creation and growth, while in Europe it seems we only read about more government debt, to maintain subsidies and how to protect an unsustainable state apparatus, which acts as a crowding-out predator of credit to companies and families.

Questionable premise

The first mistake the ECB plan has, in my opinion, is to think that the bond yields of peripheral countries are “unfairly high”. It happened before with Greece and Portugal. It starts from the premise that bond yields are higher only because of the “fear of a euro breakup” when the reason is pure and simple of solvency. The problem would be much easier to solve if Spanish bonds were discounting an “imaginary” exit from the euro, but what we are seeing discounted is a much more problematic issue. Spain spends twice its revenues.

The negative surprises such as upward revisions in the deficit of Valencia by €3bn –a tiny 82% “mistake”-, the Catalonia bailout, the savings banks’ bailouts, a state deficit that has already reached 4.6% of GDP and that, including regions, may well be significantly ahead of the government target for 2012 … All these issues make the market discount that the gap between expenditure and revenues will expand further because costs do not go down. If the market believed that Spain runs the risk of leaving the euro, bond yields would stand well above 6% due to the inability of the country to finance the primary deficit outside the Eurozone.

The risk of perverse incentives

I see the 10-year bond at 5.6% and I fear that politicians will dust-off the cheque-book for more unneeded infrastructure and construction projects. Savings banks are denying credit of tens of thousands of small and medium enterprises –which generate 80% of added value and 70% of jobs in Spain- yet they seem more than willing to provide lending to high risk construction projects promoted by the regions and financed mostly with debt.

The most dangerous incentive generated by the ECB plan is that countries with greater difficulties will concentrate most of their debt in short-term bonds, which is the tranche that the ECB would buy, because they know that the long-term maturities will have very little institutional demand. The ECB expects that by doing so it will “force” investors to buy long dated debt. I believe the ECB is wrong. Think of the example of a company with poor fundamentals that sees one of its controlling shareholders buy more shares “to support the stock”. Investors do not follow this move except for the very short term. The monetary regulator assumes that credit investors “must buy” European debt and expects that by announcing “unlimited purchases” it will create a steady demand. In my opinion, this is incorrect as the underlying problems of the economies of peripheral countries are not even close to be solved, and will likely be postponed and dragged once bond yields are “perceived” low enough to “spend again”.

I am concerned about countries which are concentrating too much short-term debt, as the chart shows. The risk is multiplied because they are funding unproductive state spending and long term government investments with short-dated bonds, a dangerous recipe.

We must also note the danger of having “cheap” credit, which could lead many governments to delay cuts and, taking advantage of the complexity of the administration, take another spending party before the Troika comes and citizens see another round of tax increases.

EvoDeudaEfec2011-12

The words that scare me: “unlimited capital”, “strict conditionality” and “sterilization”

The really sad part of the ‘rescue’ plan of the ECB is that not a single cent of that money goes to small and medium businesses, to create jobs. It goes to support a hypertrophied structure of the state, which will continue monopolizing the available credit under the promise that “something” will fall for the real economy … And it does not, because added to this ECB support countries face the urgent need to recapitalize banks, deleveraging. That is, less credit to households and businesses.Instead of supporting banks and government apparatus, and hoping that some crumbs will remain for the real economy, imagine what it would be if families and businesses were the recipients of this “unlimited capital”. Crisis over.Strict conditionality. The carrot and stick. Another problem is that the ECB plan makes countries very dependent on the ECB buying bonds to fund them while the European regulator threatens to withdraw such support if conditions are not met. The countries will be at the mercy of a quarterly ECB revision of its accounts and, therefore, subject to much greater volatility.

The strict conditionality also implies that budget cuts will be very severe. But because those cuts should be reflected in the accounts urgently to continue accessing the ECB line, governments might not focus on long-term structural reforms, focusing instead on elements of immediate impact. Tax increases.

Unlimited capital.

The ECB has not yet bought a single bond and euphoria takes over markets based on a word: “unlimited”.

I’m surprised to hear those words as if they were logical. Unlimited capital. The Eurozone GDP fell by 0.4%, more than 2000 companies file for bankruptcy each quarter, unemployment keeps rising and Europe sees plummeting fiscal revenues. But we read “unlimited” without printing money. Unlimited means generosity with other people’s money. It means debt, and lots of it in a European Central Bank whose balance sheet in 2012 is close to 34% of Eurozone GDP, close to 3 trillion dollars, much more than the Fed (20%) and the Bank of England (21%) in their countries.

ECB VS FED
 “Sterilization” 

Sterilization means that for every bond it buys the ECB has to sell other assets to prevent inflation from rising out of control and to avoid borrowing massively. Sounds good? But so far Europe has proved unable to contain inflation, just disguise it, and the ECB debt has soared by 20% annually.The issue is that the central bank will be manipulating prices but will not increase liquidity in the system. Why do it then? It only impacts prices short term but the debt and liquidity crisis lingers.Another problem is called France, which would see bond yields soar just as it is growing debt and credit ratings will suffer, as Moody’s has warned. If added to this the ECB also sells French bonds, it will weaken another engine of Europe.From the point of view of institutional demand, foreign capital is likely to continue to avoid Europe as ECB intervention becomes a constant stream of “plugging holes” changing the price of assets and then, investors simply will not be able to invest in European debt on fears that prices are manipulated randomly and according to subjective criteria.

Reforms are not debatable

Every newspaper in Spain demands a bailout as if it was a donation and the end of budget cuts. It is neither. The ECB does not donate, it lends. Spain would not need a bailout if it managed expenses according to revenues, rather than waiting for the return of fiscal revenues of the housing bubble period to finance a hypertrophied state. And the consequences of a bailout are very relevant.

A bailout has a huge impact on the creditworthiness of Spain. And even if rating agencies will promise no downgrade to junk status, the market will do it, as it did with Portugal, Greece and Ireland. Spain has to assess this risk.

Minister De Guindos said Spain is carrying out the reforms that Germany undertook 10 years ago. Let us hope it is correct.

It is easy to reject reforms from Spain’s current perspective of a heavily subsidised nation with an “undeniable right” to debt, and claim that cuts don’t work. To illustrate why reforms are essential I would like to end with a few sentences of an article about Germany’s 2004 reforms, “The three crises that undermine the European colossus ” written by Jose Comas and published in El País in 2004, when many believed Spain was the rich champion of the world:

“Germany is riddled by corruption, recession and deteriorating public services. Its crisis is structural. Convinced of the need to renew a stagnant Germany, Schröder launched in March of last year the ‘Agenda 2010’ reform program. It was a plan to make cuts in social benefits rooted in post-war German culture, and to partly dismantle the achievements of social capitalism: reducing social benefits in retirement, health care, unemployment and making layoffs easier. Schröder opened the bottle and let go the spirits that will lead to political ruin”.

Schröder must be singing “I Hate to Say I Told You So” by The Hives.

Let’s hope Spain will not be trapped by the promises of unlimited capital and donations that don’t exist.
Thanks to @absolutexe for the graph

Blaming the ECB. Better to sink the fleet than to repair the boat

(This article was published in El Confidencial on July 8th)
 
‘Everything is subject to conditionality. There is nothing without conditionality. Conditionality is what gives credibility to these measures’, Mario Draghi, president of the European Central Bank.
 
The new mantra in Spanish media is that the European Central Bank is attacking us. Before, it was the Anglo-Saxon press, then the markets, then,Germany… Now, according to some commentators, it is unquestionably Mario Draghi, president of the ECB, who is to blame for Spain’s misfortunes.
Draghi, obviously, is to blame for the reckless spending, for doubling the national debt, for the most convoluted regulation of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the ghost airports and the phantom cities. Evil.
We have spent a week hearing: “Draghi will connect the printing machine,” and it seemed everyone was shocked when it didn’t happen. The debt threshold is at its limit even at the ECB. Quoting the famous South Park…”Aaaand it’s gone.”
Debt is a drug. And like drug addicts in the infamous crack supermarkets of Harlem, we were looking forward to the ECB to saving us from our debt problem with more debt in order to keep spending. And like drug addicts, even if the ECB lowers rates to indecently low levels, the effects last less and less.
We blame the ECB, which after lending 288bn to Spanish banks and lowering interest rates to 0.75 percent does not “do more.” What more do we want it to do? A donation. Ah, no, my friends, there are no donations.
The ECB does not help. It lends. The ECB doesn’t rescue. It lends. The ECB does not donate. It lends.
When people hear that the ECB should buy Spanish debt they should also know that it’s not a favour, and that there are strict conditions attached to the agreement. But more importantly, people should know by now that the ECB buying bonds does not solve anything, as evidenced by previous purchases, which have not lowered bond yields for more than a very short period of time. 
 
These bond purchases of the past have done nothing but infect the ECB’s balance sheet the same way as the sub-prime debt packages of 2007, without attacking the underlying problem, which is excessive spending.
20120709370709-grafico-1
The ECB balance sheet has ballooned to 30 percent of gross domestic product of the Eurozone. The Federal Reserve‘s and the Bank of England’s balance sheet is 20 percent of the GDP of their countries. The Fed and BoE loans are paid back. In Europe, however, no one pays back these loans.
What is a little more debt between rich friends?
The ECB, which has nearly 40 percent of its assets in toxic bank debt, and has lowered interest rates again, has to do “more”. But who contributes to the ECB when all others ask for help? No wonder that Finlandand the Netherlands say: “Me? No, my friends.”
Spain demands “more” from the ECB even when Spain has received the equivalent of two Marshall Plans in aid since 2009. After two injections of liquidity (LTROs) that have crippled the ECB to 3bn of debt, we demand “more”. Expand the balance sheet, they say, which is nothing else than packaging and hiding debt. We demand donations. Well, no.
We live in a manipulated market and the more it is manipulated, the less the placebo effects last, because the real problems are not solved. A manipulated market to benefit the states. Financial repression.
It is curious to hear more and more people demanding financial repression, because that is what they ask for when citizens demand more inflation and mutualisation of debt. And it’s funny because media and citizens demand these measures as if everything was not going to be paid by the taxpayer in the end.
 
Financial repression
 
We claim our undeniable right to be robbed of our savings by lowering interest rates and to sink our financial capacity through inflation.
Commentators tell us insistently that there is no inflation threat. We hear over and over that this is a deflationary spiral, and meanwhile American economist Paul Krugman tells us that “a little bit of financial repression is not that bad.” However, inflation is there and it is a tax, an unfair and accumulated tax created to pay the excessive government debt.
However, the media repeats that there is no risk of inflation. Of course, anyone who pays for groceries, gas, utilities and bills sees prices going up every year while their net income after taxes plummets. Inflation according to “official figures” is 2 percent, yet the real increase in the cost of living is 5 percent per year. I recommend you read this report on the actual inflation in the United States compared to the official.
20120709950709-grafico-2

Every day, I read more suggestions from politicians, economists and other commentators calling for an “audit” of public debts and to consider “illegal” those debts incurred by a state and regional governments that have been democratically elected and supported by the majority.

When one reads “audit,” “revise debts,” or “lenders must bear some of the cost,” one needs to be aware of what it means. It means default. Because then none of us can complain that bond yields are too high. If we call for a restructuring, then bond yields are actually very low, as leaders are telling the market that here is a very high risk that one of them is elected and then defaults.
The consequences of a default are devastating:
 
. The country loses international support. The cost of the remaining debt after default would soar, as has happened in Greece and other similar countries.
. It does not reduce the need to make huge cuts. Spain has a primary deficit of almost 7 percent. Cuts would be even more severe after default, given that the funding of the structural primary deficit would be prohibitive.
. The credit crunch would be enormous. Forget lending to the real economy. The crunch would destroy growth and employment, but as the government would continue spending beyond its means, the crowding-out effect of the state would increase.
. Private companies would suffer immensely. Refinancing needs of non-financial Spanish firms are concentrated in 2014, and many would find it impossible to get financing on the market, which would lead them to cost-cutting and massive restructurings.
20120709510709-grafico-3

One of the most important sentences Draghi said on Thursday was: “What if all countries need help?” The ECB cannot bail out the big Eurozone countries. With what funds? We are talking of infecting the ECB’s balance sheet at 500bn annually if it needs to help Spain, Italy and those who have sought bailouts, when the latest could be Slovenia.

The ECB cannot buy debt without first seeing that countries have carried out drastic reforms that will prevent this debt crisis from happening again in 2014, because Europe faces 800bn of sovereign debt maturities every year over the next three years.

Spain has to solve its structural problems of competitiveness and high spending. To do that there is plenty of support and funding, but there are no donations or quick exits to a structural problem. 
Converting the ECB into the cockroach motel, where what comes in doesn’t come out, would cost much more to all – businesses, citizens and states – instead of doing what should have been done years ago. Align expenses to revenues. What everyone is doing except the state.

Watch the documentary Fraud, Why The Big Recession here:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PTpKGiVwKHY&feature=youtube_gdata_player

Further reading:

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304782404577488283442408896.html