Tag Archives: Energy

Baltic Dry Index down 65% YTD. The single clearest indicator of the global overcapacity problem.

Baltic 2012
The Baltic Dry Index is down 65% this year and at the lows of 1986.
Main reasons:
a) Oversupply of vessels. While supply has increased an average of 12% pa 2008-2012, demand has been weakening -3% pa.
b) Weaker demand from China, added to high levels of stockpiles all over the OECD, with lower iron ore demand after strong inventory build in December. Inventories stand at 5 year highs. Just the outlook of dire demand from aluminium smelters is a big worrying factor. Despite the cuts in capacity of Alcoa and Norsk Hydro, the outlook for aluminium production is weakening for 2012-2013.
c) Weather issues in Australia driving lower vessel utilization (coal supply disruptions).
d) Commerce trends weakening from LatAm to Europe (-7%) and Asia to Europe (-6%) at the same time as new building of houses, offices and infrastructure is slowing down all over the OECD as a result of the overcapacity created by the stimulus packages (mostly devoted to construction) of 2007-2010.
The Baltic Dry Index neeeds to reflect the weakening outlook for metals demand, with Chinese steel demand growing by 4% in 2012 from 10.5% in 2011 and significantly below GDP growth of 8.4%.
In addition, the delay of the 90mtpa Siere Sul iron ore project for 2016 (from 2014) adversely affects the shipping outlook.
However, brokers still expect c6.5% growth of seaborne bulk commodity supply in 2012-13, driven by 9%+ growth for iron ore and c7% for thermal coal.
On vessel overcapacity, consensus expect the fleet to grow by 13.5% in 2012 and c6% in 2013, suggesting that the shipping market will start to tighten ONLY towards the end of 2013 IF demand picks up.

Rates for Capesize have dropped below $6k and the Panamax spot at $6.5k/day can barely cover operating expenses. Rates are below cash break-even for the largest part of the sailing fleet, and China seems very happy about it, as they drive most of the excess supply and benefit at an aggregate level as a lower cost.

Going forward, we will likely see a small “dead cat bounce” on the Baltic Dry Index once we see the unwinding of the China inventory build that happened pre-New Year holiday and once we see an improvement in weather conditions in Australia, but the underlying deep problem, overcapacity in vessels and massive unused and unusable infrastructure and construction, remains. The fleet is built for a growth that is unsustainable and unreal. The world’s iron ore consumption is not going to grow 12% pa to offset the overcapacity. I believe the small uptick, unfortunately, will be used by some vessel owners to take out some capacity (not enough) and maybe raise marginal day rates, still nowhere close to 2007 levels.

OPEC Meeting Ahead: Concerns About Oversupply?

(December 2nd 2011)The December OPEC meeting in Vienna is coming and the picture of the oil market is mixed at best:

1) China PMI below 50 for the first time since Feb 2009. Global manufacturing PMIs remain weak as the table below shows, particularly in Europe.
2) Bearish US DOE weekly with high inventory build and very low implied demand. The EIA’s monthly revised oil demand numbers for September came in at 18.8m bpd, which was down from 19.05m bpd. It was also down 0.7m bpd y-o-y.
3) OPEC production in November: came in at 30.35m bpd, up 390,000 bpd from October, according to Bloomberg. The increase was led by Libya (155k bpd), Saudi Arabia (65k bpd) and Iraq (50 k bpd).

pmi global

Earlier this month we had additional evidence that the slowdown in activity is seriously reaching emerging markets now. India’s industrial output declined 5.1% y/y in October, the first decline since June 2009, with a 6.0% y/y fall in manufacturing, and with capital goods output down 25.5% y/y.

In the meantime, geopolitical concerns surrounding Syria and Iran, added to the inflationary pressures of the constant reduction of interest rates in Europe and Australia more recently, have kept oil prices at a very strong level, with Brent at $109.6 at the close of this post.

To me, one of the most interesting trends is that heavy oil continues to re-rate and that Tapis (Asia) remains at a healthy premium to Brent, proving that Asian demand remains solid despite the relative weakening in the recent data.

In this environment, another interesting trend is shown by the significant increase in the break-even price required by producers to balance their budget. At $80/bbl, Saudi Arabia’s commitments to invest in social peace and support the MENA stability is starting to prove costly. But still very comfortable versus the market price. Otherwise, Russia’s $110/bbl is a reflection of the strong investment commitments of the country, which are likely to slow down in the next years, so the headline number of break-even price might be overstated in the mid-term.

Break_even_oil_price

Considering this, it is not hard to understand why the OPEC World Outlook Reference Case oil price assumption has been increased from last year. It is assumed that, in nominal terms, prices stay in the range of $85–95/b for this decade, compared to $75–85/b in last year’s expectation.

At the same time, global refining capacity is soaring and excess capacity is likely to reach 10mmbpd. This will have a significant impact on refining margins and, as such, high oil prices might be cushioned for the final price paid by the consumer by lower refining margins.

OPEC Refining Capacity

While Russian production stays afloat at 10.3mbpd and OPEC supply stands firmly above 30mmbpd (remember OPEC quotas are 24mmbpd) I continue to think that demand growth estimates are exaggerated, and not consistent with a slowdown in global GDP growth, so until I see a strengthening of the two main demand centers, China and US, I fail to see how emerging markets will offset the decline in OECD demand to reach a total of 92mmbpd demand in 2014. I think we stay pretty much flat at 88mmbpd for a few years.  Worth analyzing Chinese implied oil demand. In November it was 9.5 mm bpd, but this excludes inventory adjustments which are not published, driven by strong diesel demand which comes from regional shortages as a result of refinery maintenance and turnarounds. Crude imports were 5.52 mm bopd, +8.5% y/y but starting to show a slowdown from previous years.

OPEC supply demand

In this context, even if we assume that oil demand rises to 92mmbpd, spare OPEC crude oil capacity is set to reach around 8 mb/d over the medium-term, and in the high case of demand around 4 mmbpd in 2011. Even if I assume no OPEC production growth, spare capacity at OPEC countries is unlikely to go below 3mmbpd, which according to my estimates is pretty much a super-tight market.

OPEC capex spend

Obviously, the big question mark in this picture is how will capex be affected by any weakness in oil prices.

The table below shows the OPEC annual upstream capex required to reach the capacity additions assumed in their base case. Interestingly, this annual capex is unlikely to be affected by a global downturn in the case it happens given it’s such a small proportion of the total global capex including downstream and midstream. So prices would have to dramatically fall below the $80/bbl level to curtail the spending.

So spending is not the issue. The issue is execution and a stable framework that allows this capacity to be added on time and on budget. This is much more difficult than spending and drilling.OPEC Capex Spend II

I think it is safe to assume that we will likely be negatively surprised by capacity additions in the system, probably assuming that around 75% of that capacity is actually added as expected. This, in any case, doesn’t impact the base case of OPEC spare capacity moving between 4 and 8mmbpd in the next five years.

So what is the OPEC meeting going to approve?. Very unlikely to see a production cut given the very high oil prices, even with pressure from Venezuela and acting president Iran to do so. It is more likely that OPEC alerts to a risk of oversupply mid-term, tries to enforce the current quotas, as every country is producing above quotas except Saudi Arabia, and extends the decision to cut or to take action on quotas to a meeting where they can assess the true impact of the Euro and debt crisis on global demand. OPEC could offer an increase in quotas that sets the limit at the current level, so basically making no impact to global supply, just recognizing the real volumes. The risk is that countries will continue to “cheat” on the new quotas, but geo-political concerns might prevent that from impacting prices.
opec quotas

Iran’s role as president of OPEC here is critical, in the middle of the aggressive rhetoric with Israel. If Iran is perceived as anti-West in its proposals to OPEC the moderate side, led by Saudi Arabia, are likely to continue to act as buffers of the oil market. If Iran leads the meeting in a conciliatory and open way, the conclusions will likely be more firmly implemented. The last OPEC meeting gave the impression of countries “against” each other in some instances. This one could be the opportunity for a constructive approach that sends a positive message to consumers and producers alike.

OPEC_production
 

Oil-Gas Spreads Rocketing Again. Careful with the European Gas Majors

Most analysts keep in their numbers for 2012 and 2013 a massive improvement in profitability for those companies that buy long term contracted gas from Russia and Norway. The thesis on ENI, E.On, GDF-Suez and others is simple. These companies have been losing money on their long term contracts due to an agressive take-or-pay obligation. Basically these groups, in a strive to maintain giant market share and profit from their exposure to retail, reached agreements with the major suppliers of gas in conditions that looked very attractive ONLY if gas prices rose and demand continued to soar. As such, major suppliers locked in large take-or-pay contracts with oil-price-linked formulas based on the “conservative” bet that gas demand in Europe would rise by 2-2.3% pa from 2007-2020 and that gas prices would retain their historical link to oil prices.None of those things happened, and greed turned into loss. The accumulation of market share was part of the problem (most of these companies control c60% of market share in their countries), making them very exposed to GDP and demand growth.

… And demand growth vanished. European gas demand peaked in 2007 and is c9% below that level four years later.

The other problem was the bet on oil-gas link remaining, driving spot gas prices higher as demand soared. What happened is that spot gas prices collapsed by 15%, oil prices soared and the long-term contracts were overpriced versus flexible spot levels. This meant losses that reached levels of €1-1.5bn in 2010 for some companies. These losses are expected to turn to profit by 2013 through a combination of re-negotiation of contracts (mainly with Gazprom) and improvement of demand. Errrr…. not likely.

The bet was wrong on both sides (demand and price), and is likely to get worse mid-term, as demand growth estimates in Europe are overstated given the downward GDP revisions. Furthermore, Gazprom and Russia are in active discussions to build a 30BCM per annum pipeline to China, and the Yamal LNG project (where Total and Qatar are likely to be major players) will create a new export route for Russian gas. Therefore, Gazprom’s “urgency” to renegotiate the take-or-pay contracts is diminishing by the day. And their policy is now to preserve wealth (reserves) not to maximize volumes exported to Europe. Gazprom’s decline rates (4% pa, some see 6%) don’t justify a policy of “maximizing volumes at any cost”.

Well, see below a very interesting chart sent by Citigroup updating on the weakening environment for utilities as the oil-gas spread widens.

oil gas spread

According to Citi “the spread is now back up to €7/MWh as you can see from the attached chart mostly driven from the appreciation of the US$ on which the oil basket that drives long-term gas prices is based. Midstream gas players should now be nearly 100% locked in through October 2012 and ~50% locked in through October 2013 at what they estimate to be a ~€5-5.5/MWh spread. So any incremental volumes sold from now on would actually be at a higher cost given today’s prices, exacerbating loss-making positions”.

The issue, as highlighted above, comes mainly for the giant market-share owners. European demand is unlikely to recover to 2007 levels until 2015, the flexibility of LNG and Asian demand is keeping the gas market in better conditions, but still oversupplied, and the strategic decision of revising take-or-pays goes radically against the political role of these giant companies as “security of supply” providers.

Expect earnings revisions to go…down.

ENI

Consensus expects a return to profitability from demand recovery and re-negotiation of contracts generating an uplift in EBITDA of between €1.5bn and €2bn. However, with Italian gas demand down by 4% in 9M 11 and new gas volumes coming from Libya (16mcm/day, or 1.5bcm in 2012 due to the opening of Greenstream) prices are falling further while ENI may be required to assume some Russian take-or-pay obligations, equivalent to an additional 2 bcm in 2012e, unless we see a favorable outcome from renegotiation with Gazprom on both flexibility and price, something that seems unlikely.

E.ON

Consensus expecting gas midstream business to come back to profit in 2013 with approximately 50/60% contracts renegotiated by end of 2012 Bull case: +€1bn in Ebitda 2012 and +€2bn Ebitda 2013. In a no-renegotiation bear case -€850m in Ebitda 2012 and -€1.7bn in Ebitda 2013

GDF-SUEZ

Concerning GDF-Suez, new negotiations are starting now on contractual clauses (renegotiation every 3 years). Normalization is expected by 2013 with still a wide range in the consensus: (+€1bn – +€2bn) €1bn delta on 2012e Ebitda of Gas division from one broker to another.

Oil Is Cheaper Than Water. Feedback From The Oil Money Conference

(Published in Cotizalia in October)First, excuse the interruption in posting in the past month.

I’ve spent the last weeks busy with the launch of my new fund, The Ecofin Global Oil & Gas Fund, and traveling, visiting some of the most significant discoveries of the last decade, from Moccasin in the Gulf of Mexico to Jubilee in Ghana, through oil shale assets in Texas, and culminating with the most important annual meeting of the global oil industry, theOil & Money Conference . An exceptional event, with the participation of people like the secretary general of OPEC, Abdalla Salem El-Badri, the Saudi Prince Turki Al Faisal, the directors of the largest oil companies, major financial institutions and some investors. If I remember correctly, one of the very few representatives of hedge funds was me.

Well, what I promised to my Twitter followers is debt. Here are the main conclusions of the conference.

The main concern of the producers is demand. Saudi Prince Turki Al Faisal stressed it several times. “We will not increase production of 9.2 million barrels per day to 15 million when demand is well covered by all producing countries . We’re not going to invest billions of dollars to see barrels unsold at the port. ” Still, Saudi Arabia maintains its investment program of $129 billion and the projects that would guarantee that production cushion if needed. I myself have seen the development of the Kursaniyah and Khurais fields and these can produce much more when they want … if they want. I have also seen Ghwar and the much criticised decline is being addressed through new technology and improved recovery.

According to estimates from several industry leaders at the conference, up to 15% of current world oil demand is “credit bubble” driven, that is, generated by low interest rates. If we add to this that much of the industry leaders question the sustainability of demand in China, it is normal that during the meetings there were strong calls for a cut in quotas in OPEC’s next meeting in December. We’ll talk about it here if I’m invited to Vienna this year.

The problem is not the quantity and quality of resources available, but the increasingly onerous demands by producing countries , either excessive regulatory level U.S. and European legal uncertainty or lack of political certainty in others. Christophe de Margerie, CEO of Total, in a brilliant intervention, made ​​it clear. To invest for 30 years $720 billion annually (global capex) the industry must have an environment that will generate adequate returns to capital cost and risk.

Worldwide, De Margeries stressed that today there are over 100 years of demand covered with proven reserves of conventional oil, heavy oil and oil sands.The problem is not of available resources, as evidenced by recent discoveries, 500 million barrels in French Guyana less than a month ago, for example, but that the industry is allowed to generate an adequate return and develop those resources safely and effectively. And there I agree. After twelve years accepting poor returns, and seeing their shares do nothing, it is logical that a ROCE (return on capital employed) of 25% at $ 80/bbl has to be a minimum target when the average cost of capital is nearly 9% and projects last 20-25 years.

One of the most critical areas in the conversations came from the optimistic estimates of demand growth of the IEA. Everyone agrees that these will be difficult to achieve, especially in regard to the return to growth in the OECD, as estimates don’t take into account the de-industrialization and dramatic increases in efficiency, but also in regard to emerging countries. At the end of the day, the projected demand of the agencies is always “diplomatic” and tends to err in excess.

Many participants reiterated that the optimistic estimates of demand, added to some apocalyptic estimates on  supply, give a sense of tightness and urgency that the physical market does not see anywhere . After all,  OECD inventories are comfortably within historical average. In this sense, many criticized the exaggerated estimates saying that they generate an unnecessary investment bubble. Of course, make no mistake, no one complained that the price of oil was too high. “Doomsday predictions are making a huge favor, and free, to the industry” said a friend.

In this sense, all industry leaders criticized the monetarist policies and inflationary stimulus plans and low interest rates, as the main cause of increased commodity prices (oil has risen less than sugar and rice, for example, in 2011). Jeff Currie of Goldman Sachs noted that the impact of financial positions in the oil price has proven to be imperceptible, and that the price is not a question of lack of supply, because the commodities where there is no shortage or are cultivated have risen as much or more than oil, and reiterated the impoverishment of investment conditions as the great problem of the sector.

One of the most interesting parts was the analysis by geologists on the process of reducing the decline in production from mature fields field by field, with decline reductions of up to 30%. Petrofac is going to implement this in Mexico with Pemex. It’s all about price. With high oil, tertiary recovery is very attractive.

The Secretary of OPEC, Abdullah al-Badri, summed up the situation: OPEC does not seek to “defend” oil prices . The current price is justified by cost inflation added to a shortage of rigs available to rent that reach $ 450,000 a day, and the shortage of qualified personnel. “All the engineers are in hedge funds” a friend of Kuwait Petroleum told me.

The average price where OPEC needs to balance their budgets is an average of $ 75-85/bbl, as the social costs of the countries are increasing and therefore the average price can go up as well.

The 2010-2020 plan of the twelve OPEC countries includes 132 projects, $150 billion investment and 20 million additional barrels a day of production .The spare capacity of OPEC now stands at 5 million barrels a day , which has proven to be an excellent cushion when Libyan exports were interrupted, which is not expected to recover to pre-war level until 2013.

On Iraq, Issam Al-Chalabi, former minister of oil in the country, said that production forecasts have improved thanks to the improvement of some contracts to make the investments more attractive, and thanks to lower cost ($ 6 to $ 11 million per well), but lack of infrastructure and legal structure, as there is still no oil law, will make it difficult to reach 3.8 million barrels per day of production in 2013. Still, Iraq is exporting 2.2 million barrels / day and large projects generate returns of 23-25% (IRR).

I’ll stick with the following conclusions:

1 .- Demand is inflated and probably will not reach 92 million barrels a day if the debt reduction process of the global economic system is carried out, finally. The best thing that the industry has learned over the past 25 years is to avoid flooding the market. Seeing what has happened to other industries, it is logical that the oil industry puts back into the center of their investment decisions a decent return on capital employed, and not capex based on optimistic forecasts on demand.

2 .- Although the world is more complex today than ever and the geopolitical situation can always get worse , the industry is not going to stop investing, as it did in 2007-08 or 96-99. Annual investments to produce 90-95 million barrels per day of production (including unsold surplus capacity) will remain.

3 .- Exploration investment will not increase over the $150 billion annually but industry will intensify the investment in non-conventional oil in the United States, being of low political risk and high profitability. The industry will continue to explore and develop the frontier areas, especially West Africa, where there are no production constraints imposed by OPEC membership, crude oil quality is very high, the wells are under-explored and regulatory and legal conditions are very attractive.

Is oil is expensive? Less than mineral water, platinum or silver. As Europe gathers 65% of the price of gasoline from taxes, and their companies collected $ 6/barrel from refining margins, you know what governments have to do to improve competitiveness . Lower taxes. Blaming the producers who invest $400 billion in developing their resources, is a lot of rhetoric and little reality.
Detailed feedback below:
HRH Prince Turki Al Faisal:
No other country can compete with the Kingdom on proven reserves. If it added unproven, as Iran and Venezuela do, it would still rank #1 in oil resources worldwide.
9.2mmbpd of current production with spare capacity of 2.3mmbpd having 20% of all proven oil reserves.
The Kingdom is pushing projects that will be able to deliver 15mmbpd.
However, Saudi Aramco has no intention to boost production to 15mmbpd because demand is being well supplied by other countries. This target is self imposed, given the billions of dollars spent on increasing capacity to see unsold barrels of oil in the port.
However, Aramco keeps its $129bn capex program still ongoing.
The Kingdom covers 40% of domestic needs through gas and will look at nuclear and other options but costs are not acceptable today.
Saudi Arabia is a picture of health and stability compared to any other country in the region… Even several European ones.
The Kingdom continues to be a leader in the region supporting Bahrain, Oman, Egypt and other countries with twelve packages of $8bn each an another eight aid packages of $4bn each.
Saudi Arabia GDP per capita $23k, higher than any other BRIC country.
Issam Al-Chalabi, former minister of Iraq oil.
Current production 2.7mmbpd and 2.2 exported. Tough to get to 3.8mmbpd and above 3mmbpd exports due to lack of infrastructure. Maximum 5.5mmbpd by 2020.
Lack of proper rehabilitation of existing facilities, putting at risk the reservoirs.
Costs range from $6mm to $11mm per well.
The increase of reserves to 143 bn boe needs more credible proof.
Iraq still without complete government (min defense, interior, etc).
For Kurdish minorities KRG main issue is to legitimize the Kurdistan contracts which are deemed illegal by Iraq. Also look to get recognised the “disputed lands” which is twice as big and oil-rich as the old Kurdistan.
Oil and Gas Law. Six drafts submitted. None approved.
Iraq will be affected by what is happening in Syria as they are supporting Assad.
. Shokri Ghanem, former minister of oil, Libya.
Warehouses, contractor camps, cars, spare parts and facilities have been looted.
Says the war has not ended, and attacks continue.
Says return to production onshore virtually impossible.
Almost 2000 4WD cars needed just to move personnel.
Production: 550kbpd end year, 1mmbpd in June. Pre-war levels at best two years.
Staff unrest at oil fields a big concern.
Also a big concern on whether TNC will re-negotiate all contracts.
Gabrielli (Petrobras CEO)
“The modern world cannot live without oil and gas, and this will not change”.
10x more financial contracts than physical.
Pre-salt $45/bbl breakeven.
Demand down in OECD, up on EM. More efficiency expected.
Climate change targets will likely be abandoned in OECD, and impossible to implement in EM. However, efficiency improvements will continue to bring demand lower than GDP growth.
10-25% of demand to be serviced by biofuels.
More challenging production, not more expensive.
Christophe De Margeries (Total)
“Of course there are plenty of reserves in the world, but it’s harder and harder to access them as countries want to keep them for their own people” “not a question of oil resources but exportable capacity” “there are more and more resources but not available at the same time”
Fossil fuels to represent 76% of energy supply in 2030. After Fukushima gas to become second largest energy source by 2030.
Gas increased by 24% from previous analysis, nuclear down 5%. Solar +17% pa to 2030 and Biofuels +5% pa.
Significant resources yet to be produced:
. 3,000 billion barrels. More than 100 years of demand of oil available including oil shale and heavy oil.
. 2,500 billion barrels of gas. 135 years.
“Fight with contractors is not anymore here. The current framework works”
“Price of oil will have to stay high to justify investments or these will collapse as returns are pretty average”
Libya to full production in 2012
“The oil and gas industry is the most heavily taxed in the world, with up to 80% tax from production country to up to 60% in consumption country”