The Federal Reserve’s legal mandate is clear. It must focus on stable prices and maximum employment. In the past five years, the Fed has failed on both. Inflation remains materially above the 2 percent target, reaching a decade-high 25% cumulative inflation in the 2021-2025 period, while restrictive monetary conditions have been limited to rate hikes, which weigh most heavily on the small and medium-sized firms that generate most of net employment growth.
This failure was not merely a matter of missing a forecast but a policy framework that became narrative-driven rather than data-dependent. The Fed spent much of 2025 moving between concerns about inflation from tariffs based on ideology and a growing admission of weakness in the labor market. However, it continued to treat interest rates as its overwhelmingly dominant instrument. That is a poor policy mix when the problem of persistent inflation was caused by excessive government spending. Kritzman, at MIT Sloan, concluded that “mathematically, the overwhelming driver of that burst of inflation in 2022 was federal spending, not the supply chain.” However, the Fed’s policy was directed at penalizing the private sector while incentivizing large government deficit spending.
The Fed defines price stability as inflation running at 2 percent, measured by the PCE price index. That goal was still unmet at the end of 2025. Headline PCE inflation rose 2.9 percent year over year in December, while core PCE inflation was 3.0 percent. Both headline and core inflation increased 0.4 percent in that month alone. This is not price stability. It is persistent erosion of household purchasing power. A family does not suffer the inflation target in a Federal Open Market Committee statement but significantly higher price increases than those reflected in CPI at the supermarket, the gas station, rent payment, and utility bills. The fact that inflation has slowed from its 2022 peak does not mean the inflation problem has gone away. Prices remain permanently higher after years of monetary and fiscal excess, and the cumulative loss of purchasing power remains embedded in household budgets.
The Fed’s narrative during 2025 frequently focused on temporary factors, inexistent tariff effects, labor-market rebalancing, and the expected path of core inflation. Some of those factors mattered. But the larger error was to ignore the monetary and fiscal origins of the inflation shock. Inflation did not appear suddenly. It was the consequence of an extraordinary expansion of money, liquidity, and deficit-financed spending in 2021 through 2024.
The United States ran enormous fiscal deficits even after the pandemic emergency had passed. Government spending grew aggressively, while the central bank’s earlier asset-purchase programs absorbed a large volume of government and mortgage debt. The result was a policy mix in which fiscal expansion was incentivized and monetary discipline was inexistent.
The Fed was not a brake on fiscal excess. It was an enabler.
Quantitative easing and the expansion of the central-bank balance sheet created the perception that all public deficits could be financed at artificially low cost without consequences. That illusion encouraged Yellen and Biden to treat debt issuance as painless and made it easier to sustain spending levels that exceeded the productive capacity of the economy. Yellen’s reckless decision to refinance most maturities with short-term bonds proves this. She was clearly expecting more easing in 2025 after the unnecessary rate cuts announced in the middle of the election campaign.
Money supply growth, deficit spending, and ultra-low policy rates were not small mistakes or isolated events created by an emergency. Together they created too much unproductive demand relative to available supply. When supply chains normalized and energy prices fell, some disinflation followed, but the excess monetary and fiscal impulse had already lifted the general price level and distorted the allocation of capital. Furthermore, the overall inflation continued to rise even when energy prices fell below 2022 levels and supply chain costs dropped to pre-COVID-era prices, proving that monetary and fiscal excess, not a supply shock, was the main cause.
The government’s and Fed’s responses made the error worse. Instead of controlling spending and understanding the fiscal source of persistent inflation, using the balance sheet more forcefully, the government increased public spending by 2 trillion above the emergency levels of the COVID-era, and the Fed placed the burden of restrictive policy on private sector borrowers. Families with credit cards, first-time homebuyers, small businesses, and entrepreneurs became the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
Small firms are the backbone of the U.S. labor market. Businesses with fewer than 250 employees account for more than 51 percent of net job creation and generate 58 percent of net private-sector employment growth from the first quarter of 2023 through the end of 2025.
Small businesses do not finance investments like large listed corporations, issuing bonds, syndicated loans, or share issuances. Small businesses need bank credit, using variable-rate loans, personal guarantees, commercial-property lending, and retained earnings.
The Fed’s restrictive policy hits the productive economy hardest. A large company with a strong balance sheet can delay expansion. A small business with a refinancing need will stop hiring, cut inventories, postpone equipment purchases, or close altogether.
NFIB data shows that the average short-term loan rate paid by small-business borrowers was 8.4 percent in December 2025. Only 25 percent of owners reported borrowing regularly, a historically low share.
By keeping liquidity elevated, enabling government excess, and hiking rates, the Fed has made borrowing costs prohibitive and often nonexistent for small businesses (SMEs). For many banks it became safer and more profitable to hoard government debt than to lend to families and businesses.
SME credit constraints accelerate employment losses, accounting for roughly one-third of the aggregate employment response to monetary-policy shocks. Thus, the central bank cannot claim to support maximum employment while maintaining a framework that punishes the firms responsible for most of the job creation.
The Fed’s own institutional analysis recognized that policy remained contractionary even after rate reductions, with the federal funds rate above the neutral level. Therefore, monetary policy was still restrictive while inflation was not being driven by an overheated private economy.
There is no compelling case for maintaining a punitive rate stance when private-sector credit creation is weak, hiring is slowing, and the inflation impulse is increasingly concentrated in transitory categories such as energy or government-driven cost pressures. The correct question is not whether inflation is above target. It is what is causing it.
As inflation comes from excessive government spending, debt monetization, or a temporary energy shock that is fading, higher rates do nothing to solve the source of the problem. As such, it gives the impression of a restrictive, inflation-control-focused policy but it is very far from the stated intention. The Fed was exceedingly accommodative when it came to bloating the size of government in the economy and aggressively hawkish against the private productive sector. Therefore, rate hikes simply crushed investment and consumption in sectors that did not create the inflation.
This is the massive policy mistake at the heart of the Fed’s 2021-2025 approach. It tried to cure inflation through higher borrowing costs while leaving the balance-sheet channel underused and allowing fiscal dominance to remain unchallenged. The Fed was trying to cure obesity in the system by starving the part of the economy that was already thin.
Interest rates are a blunt instrument, similar to using a cannon to swat flies. They affect every borrower, but their damage is greatest for households and smaller firms. The balance sheet is a more direct tool for removing excess liquidity, reducing monetary distortions, and restoring discipline to governments and financial markets.
The Fed did reduce securities holdings by around $2.2 trillion from June 2022. However, in October 2025, it announced that securities runoff would cease from December 1, even though its balance sheet remained extraordinarily large by historical standards. That decision sent the wrong signal. It suggested that the Fed was more willing to preserve the sovereign debt bubble and manage short-term market corrections than to implement monetary normalization. The Fed’s balance sheet has never returned to normal. It simply declines for a short period of time, only to rise again.
The Fed should have accelerated the balance-sheet reduction in a transparent and predictable manner instead of delaying it, allowing Treasury and mortgage-backed securities to roll off more rapidly, thus reducing excess money in the system. Powell and the Fed should have made clear that monetary policy cannot serve as a permanent buyer of government debt. They did the opposite.
That framework would reduce excess liquidity without forcing the entire adjustment onto entrepreneurs and working families. Furthermore, it would also create pressure for greater fiscal discipline, because government borrowing would face a more realistic market price.
Kevin Warsh offers an opportunity for a needed change in focus and approach. He recognizes that the Fed has two major instruments, interest rates and the balance sheet, and that they do not affect the economy equally. Warsh has argued that balance-sheet policy disproportionately benefits holders of financial assets, while rate policy reaches broadly across the real economy. He has supported a smaller balance sheet alongside lower interest rates, rather than treating rate hikes as the automatic and only answer to every inflation concern. This would make price stability and maximum employment easier to achieve.
