Every end of the year, by the end of the year, we receive numerous estimates of global GDP growth and inflation for the following year. Historically, almost in all cases, expectations of inflation and growth are too optimistic in December for the following year.

If we look at the track record of central banks, it is particularly poor in predicting inflation while large supranational entities tend to err on the side of optimism in GDP estimates. The IMF or the OECD, for example, have been particularly poor at estimating recessions, but mostly accurate at making long-term trend estimates. Contrary to popular belief, it seems that most forecasts are better at identifying long-term economic dynamics than short term ones.

One of the great mistakes among economists is to receive the measures of central banks as if it was the revealed truth. It is surprising and concerning that it is considered mandatory to defend each one of the actions of central banks. That, of course, in public. In private, many colleagues shake their heads in disbelief at the accumulation of bubbles and imbalances. And, as on so many occasions, the lack of constructive criticism leads to institution complacency and a chain of errors that all citizens later regret.

Monetary policy in Europe has gone from being a tool to help states make structural reforms to become an excuse not to carry them out.